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The European Union in the Colombian Peace Process

Quo vadis Colombia?



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In October 2016, the Colombian people were asked by the government to ratify the peace agreement negotiated over many years between the government and the FARC guerrilla. Contrary to all forecasts, the vote was negative. The peace process is faltering for the time being. A “No” to peace? The country is splitting itself into two camps, thus lingering in a dangerous state of uncertainty. Many local people are asking themselves whether the “No” to the peace treaty will lead to renewed unrest and the FARC taking up arms once again. At the beginning of 2016, the conflicting parties succeeded in a first unilateral, then two-sided ceasefire. The European Union accompanied and supported the peace process in all its phases. The key points of the negotiations included the issues of justice and reparation – two points that many Colombians found lacking in the final text of the peace treaty. At the same time, President Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo. It will be interesting to see how the political situation will continue to develop.

In autumn, events in Colombia came close to taking a new turn. After four years of negotiations in Cuba and five decades of ongoing armed conflict, the Colombian government finally managed to conclude a peace agreement with the FARC rebels. On 2 October 2016, the Colombian people were asked for ratification in a referendum on whether to approve the agreement or not. Surprisingly, when counting the votes on Sunday evening, the “No” votes won with a slim majority. A “No” to peace? While the supporters of the agreement and the international community greeted the election result with shock, the “No” camp around ex-president Álvaro Uribe Vélez protested that they had not voted against peace, but rather against the far-reaching

assurances given by the government to the FARC rebels in the 297-page agreement. “Naturally”, they are hoping for further negotiations and an improved proposal for a new vote. Everyone wants peace, but not in its current form.

The country is splitting itself into two camps, thus lingering in a dangerous state of uncertainty. Many local people are asking themselves whether the “No” to the peace treaty will lead to renewed unrest and the FARC taking up arms once again. On the other hand, the leaders of the FARC around Rodrigo Londoño, alias “Timochenko”, protest that they want to continue to sit at the negotiating table. The news from Oslo on the following Friday, 7 October, was similarly surprising: despite the nega-

tive outcome of the vote, the 2016 Nobel Peace Prize went to Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos for his accomplishments in the peace process between the government and the FARC rebels. The committee justified its decision by wishing to give a clear signal that the peace process should continue.

At the beginning of 2016, the conflicting parties had agreed on a ceasefire monitored by the United Nations, which was initially unilateral, but since the end of August 2016, also on the side of the government. The European Union had also acted as an intermediary in the negotiations and supported the post-conflict phase. The main sticking point in the renegotiations will especially be the political participation of the FARC, as well as the prosecution of the offenses committed by them. The word “justice” was missing from the current text of the agreement in the eyes of the narrow majority of Colombians. However, at the beginning of December 2016, the Constitutional Court of Colombia allowed the application of the peace treaty, which has been adopted after the referendum without holding another one.

1. BACKGROUND TO THE ARMED CONFLICT

The ideological starting point of the armed conflict in Colombia dates back to the middle of the 19th century, when the Colombian aristocracy, and subsequently the entire population, was divided into two political camps, liberal and conservative, whose struggle for political supremacy repeatedly led to armed clashes between the supporters of both parties. The conflict culminated in “La Violencia”, a wave of violence in the period from 1948 to 1958. “La Violencia” was triggered by the assassination of the extremely popular liberal presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in Bogotá. His death led to extremely

heavy conflicts in the capital Bogotá, called “El Bogotazo”, which then spread to the whole country. According to estimates, they cost the lives of approximately 200,000 Colombians.¹ In 1958, to end this conflict and avoid bloody clashes in the future, liberals and conservatives agreed to occupy the office of President alternately. They formed the grand coalition National Front (“Frente Nacional”), a liberal-conservative power cartel. At that time, the National Front appeared to be a sensible solution, with the help of which it was possible to actually reduce the violence to a manageable level. The calming of the political situation in the decades that followed led to an impressive industrial modernisation, which made Colombia one of the most economically successful societies in Latin America. However, the new power cartel left no room for alternatives and new political movements. Murder of candidates for political office and electoral fraud prevented new political players from participating in government affairs. This exclusion took on particularly grim dimensions in 1970, when the movement of the ex-dictator Rojas Pinilla was cheated of its ballot-box triumph, which eventually led to his frustrated supporters launching the nationalist Catholic M-19 guerrilla movement.² Guerrilla groups of peasant origin had already been springing up in rural areas since the 1960s, which increasingly took off against the liberal-conservative elite.³

In the 1980s, drug trafficking from Colombia to the US, initially with marijuana and later with cocaine, continued to increase and the formation of the first drug cartels followed. Since from the perspective of rich landowners in rural areas, the government in Bogotá did not do enough against the peasant guerrillas in the hinterland, who also tried to win (back) land from the owners with the use of weapons, during the 1980s they sought like-minded people

for their defence. The initially informal alliances included landowners, local security agencies, regional politicians and drug traffickers who shared similar interests. However, they soon developed into tightly organised paramilitary organisations.⁴ The political leadership was finally forced to respond suitably to these events and the time of the National Front came to an end. A new constitution had to be created in order to redistribute political power and to remove players like the M-19 guerrilla groups from illegality. With the creation of a new constitution in 1991, the government attempted to respond to historically determined issues such as the liberal-conservative power cartel as well as to resolve the new conflicts. This was preceded by many years of peace negotiations with the conflicting parties. Decades before the current peace efforts, there were repeated attempts in Colombia to finally resolve the armed conflict.

The attempts to bring peace to the country in the long term are almost as old as the conflict itself. The peace dialogue on the reintegration of guerrilla organisations into the state system and the transition to a multiparty system had already started under the presidency of Belisario Betancur from 1982 to 1986. He advocated the concept of national dialogue and a policy oriented towards reconciliation and talks with the guerrillas. This policy was continued by President Virgilio Barco from 1986 to 1990. After years of negotiations, several guerrilla organisations, including the Popular Liberation Army, M-19 and Quintín Lamé, indicated their willingness to reintegrate into the system on the condition of a comprehensive state reform. The M-19 finally agreed to lay down its arms and the government for its part declared to initiate a process of democratisation of the state and society. Despite several incidents, both parties stuck to their intents. The M-19

finally began building a legal political party, the M-19 Democratic Alliance.⁵ The new constitution arose in a mood of awakening; after a long time, the population once again had the feeling of being able to actively participate in political events. Following the election of the so-called Constituent Assembly (“Constituyente”), in 1990, the constitution was finally submitted to the public on 4 July 1991.⁶ The Constituent Assembly reformed the state institutions with the extensive involvement of former guerrillas (26 % of the votes for the Constituent Assembly were for the M-19).⁷

Despite significant improvements in the new constitution, in particular for indigenous and Afro-Colombian people, as well as the legalisation of the M-19, there was no lasting peace in Colombia. Guerrilla groups, most notably the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – National Liberation Army) were still active, especially in the hinterland. Instead of a resolution of the conflict after the adoption of the new constitution, the opposite occurred: the sphere of action of the armed players spread, the formerly political goals mingled with the financial interests of all involved. Both guerrillas and paramilitaries were accused of kidnapping, terror and drug trafficking.⁸

Critics of the current peace process in Colombia are afraid of just such consequences. All attempts have thus far failed; however, it should be emphasised that the participation of the international community has never been as strong as it is now. Thus, the key may lie in dealing with international partners, which has also been the great hope in Colombia in the recent months. However, the situation remains critical after the negative outcome of the referendum on 2 October 2016. The armed

conflict in Colombia is now regarded as the longest-running conflict in Latin America and new violent players and profiteers are constantly appearing.⁹

In addition to internal players, the conflict in (and in connection with the drug trade “around” it) Colombia also repeatedly affects, directly or indirectly, its neighbours, above all Venezuela and Ecuador. The United States, the historical ally of the Colombian governments over the last decades, has played a decisive role and has been blamed for (much) complicity in the Colombian debacle.¹⁰ The Colombian government of former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez initiated a turnaround, trying as the first government not for reconciliation with the guerrillas, but with the paramilitary forces, and was militarily harder than ever on the guerrillas. Both military and legal initiatives have been launched in this context in order to reduce violence and illegally armed players. In 2005, starting with the passage of the “Justice and Peace Law” (*Ley de Justicia y Paz*)¹¹, intensive efforts were made to end the armed conflict, starting with the paramilitary organisations, as already stated. The Justice and Peace Law was indeed successful and launched a demobilisation process of the paramilitary AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – United Self-Defenders of Colombia).

According to the law, members of the paramilitary units who voluntarily lay down their weapons receive significantly lighter sentences if they help clarify the crimes committed by the AUC, renounce violence and disclose their assets for the purpose of victim compensation. Within the framework of the demobilisation of the AUC, numerous links between politicians and the AUC were uncovered. At the same time, intensive action was taken against the FARC guerrilla, however, this involved military operations instead of negotiations.

This approach was strongly recalled in the current campaign by followers of the “No” vote to the Santos government’s peace agreement with the FARC guerrillas and former President Uribe was declared a figurehead.

In March 2008, the then most important leaders of the FARC lost their lives: the decade-long leader of the FARC, Manuel Marulanda, as well as the operational leader, Raúl Reyes, who was killed in an attack by the Colombian military on a FARC camp on Ecuadorian territory. This military intervention by the Colombian government, without the prior approval of Ecuador, worsened the already tense relationship of Colombia with Ecuador and Venezuela even further. Former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez Frías and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa were accused by the Colombian government of supporting the FARC and thus undermining the Colombian peace process.¹² Whilst evaluating the material seized following the killing of Raúl Reyes, as well as the links to the governments of Ecuador and Venezuela¹³, contacts between FARC and the Spanish ETA¹⁴ could also be demonstrated.¹⁵ Many supporters of the “No” vote celebrate these military successes to this day and see them as the only effective means against the guerrillas. This also split the “No” camp into several sub-groups. Some of the most faithful supporters of Uribe’s policy still wish for a military defeat of FARC; most, however, prefer a new peace agreement with stronger restrictions on FARC than in the current negotiating text.

Since 7 August 2010, Colombia has been governed by former Minister of National Defence under Uribe Vélez, Juan Manuel Santos.¹⁶ Supporters of Uribe consider Santos a “traitor” as he did not continue the policy of Uribe Vélez “contrary to his electoral promises”, but, shortly after taking office, sought a diplomatic solution to

the armed conflict with international participation. Santos has been working intensively for peace in the country since the beginning of his office, bringing FARC to the negotiating table in Havana.

2. NEGOTIATIONS IN HAVANA UNDER EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION

After initially informal talks with the FARC guerrillas, the Santos government began its first formal peace negotiations with the FARC in Oslo on 18 October 2012 in its second year in office. On the other hand, the significantly smaller ELN guerrillas marginalised in the hinterland were never included in formal talks due to their unwillingness to negotiate. Since the very beginning, the peace process had been supported by international participation and the desire for the most neutral climate for negotiations possible. From 19 November 2012 to 26 September 2016, the talks continued in Havana, Cuba. Norway, Cuba, Chile and Venezuela acted as international guarantors and have accompanied the peace process since the first talks.

As the negotiations progressed, the involvement of the United Nations and the European Union also increased. In May 2016, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini said that the EU had “supported the current peace process since the beginning and it will continue to accompany Colombia in the post-conflict phase. Solid peace can only be built if the final peace agreement is effectively implemented and the EU has vast experience in peace building. We are determined to stand by Colombia, a close partner and ally, in its noble pursuit of bringing durable and lasting peace as well new opportunities to all Colombians”.¹⁷ Both the United Nations and the European Union have set up multi-million aid funds to also

provide financial support to Colombia in the post-conflict phase. The European Union also supported the negotiation process in Havana with the deployment of Irish Special Envoy Eamon Gilmore and declared Colombia a strategic partner. The EU has pledged Colombia EUR 18 million from the EU Trust Fund and the Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability to support the Colombian government’s crisis management plan. In addition, EUR 67 million were budgeted for the ongoing cooperation between 2014 and 2017. The package includes both short- and medium-term measures in the form of technical assistance, as well as grants and loans which will be provided after the signing of the final peace agreement. In addition, a Colombia fund has been set up, to which the Commission and ten Member States have already committed a total of EUR 90 million. The EIB (European Investment Bank) has committed a loan package of EUR 400 million to the actions financed by the Trust Fund. On the Member State side, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden in particular have played a leading role since the fund was established.¹⁸ Other Member States have subsequently pledged their support to the Commission.

According to EU Commissioner for International Cooperation Neven Mimica, this is “a clear signal of the EU’s ongoing and increasing commitment to Colombia – both over the short term, in helping to promote peace in areas affected by conflict, and over the long term, supporting durable and sustainable peace in the country”.¹⁹

The FARC guerrillas promised – with some interruptions, which led to setbacks in the negotiations – since the beginning of the talks in Cuba, a unilateral ceasefire and tried to convince the government of a mutual ceasefire. However, especially due to the repeated interruptions of the unilateral ceasefire by the government, until the end

of the negotiations, the security concerns were too great to promise a bilateral ceasefire. Key topics in the negotiations included the establishment of the truth, the compensation of the victims, land reform, democratisation, the solution concerning illegal drug production and trafficking, the political integration of the guerrillas and the prosecution of offences committed by them, as well as the participation of the Colombian people in the peace process and their approval of the agreement. It was only on 29 August 2016 that an agreement was reached on all key issues and the security situation had improved so much that the government finally agreed to a bilateral ceasefire. The FARC guerrillas responded euphorically.

After that, things started to move at rapid pace: at the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York at the end of September 2016, President Santos presented the final text of the peace agreement to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini. Santo presented “a new Colombia on its way to peace” to the world. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has pledged support to the UN supervision over compliance of the agreement. While this success was celebrated internationally, the Colombian people reacted cautiously. The “Yes” camp was seriously afraid that something could happen again at the last minute, while the opponents of the agreement had already been using all social media channels to mobilise people against Santos.

On 26 September 2016, the final text of the peace agreement was signed in the presence of many international state guests, including EU Special Envoy Eamon Gilmore.²⁰ On 27 September 2016, the Council decided to suspend the application

of restrictive EU measures against FARC with Regulation (EU) 2016/1710²¹. With this amendment to the “EU terrorism regulation”²², the Council of the European Union responded to a long-standing FARC demand and suspended the obligation to freeze the assets of the FARC and the ban on the provision of funds and economic resources to them. From the EU’s point of view, the FARC was no longer considered a terrorist organisation.

3. THE REJECTION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT

This decision by a narrow majority of 50.25 % of the 12.8 million Colombians taking part in the vote at first triggered helplessness in Colombia. Only 40 % of the eligible voters participated in the referendum.²³ Colombia was in shock; despite intensive campaigns for “No”, especially in the coastal region and Antioquia, nobody had really counted on such a negative outcome to the referendum. Already at the beginning of the voting day, supporters of “No” were already ranting on social media platforms such as Facebook that today was a “black day and that the government would surely manipulate the outcome of the vote until the votes in favour prevail”. The final result came as a surprise to everyone, despite intensive campaigns on both sides. While the opponents of the peace agreement fell into a frenzy of ecstasy and celebrated the result, its proponents were dismayed. Fear that a new wave of violence might follow was spreading. Everyone was eagerly awaiting the reactions of the government – including the FARC leadership and the international community.

The “No” resulted in a difficult domestic and foreign policy situation; even economically, things were suddenly not looking so bright in Colombia. In addition to international aid, the post-conflict phase had promised numerous private investments

and a general boost to the Colombian economy; this now stood at an intangible distance. International markets reacted critically to the rejection of the peace treaty; the Colombian peso, depending on further political and economic events, faced a further downturn in the coming months against the dollar and the euro. The debates surrounding the peace process were conducted extremely emotionally in Colombia. The supporters of “No” led a discourse extremely focused on the past and hardly oriented towards the future. 270,000 deaths and more than seven million internally displaced persons were remembered with mantra-like devotion and images of FARC massacres in recent decades were posted on social media platforms. The government underestimated the influence of new media. While Facebook was heavily used by the opponents of the peace agreement and new posts were published several times a day, the government barely responded to them. The government relied more on traditional advertising methods, thereby overlooking an important channel.

While the “Yes” mood dominated in the capital Bogotá and peace was strongly promoted, “No” prevailed throughout the rural regions, which had in part been severely affected by the armed conflict, but at the same time strongly sympathised with the paramilitary organisations. In some of these areas, gangs on the bounds of legality, which had inherited the legacy of the paramilitary groups, still dominate everyday life. The supporters of the “No” vote argue that “land” should not be “handed over” to the guerrillas and that the government was doing just that with the peace agreement. The government’s concessions to the FARC were viewed very negatively; in particular, the plans to transfer political posts in the Senate and the House of Representatives to the FARC without prior election. The gen-

erous concessions regarding prosecution were also viewed negatively. On the other hand, the victims showed a great ability to forgive and accept an “imperfect” peace. All representatives of the victims were in favour of peace, which left a particularly unpleasant aftertaste to the vote. Thus, the victims of the conflict feel in part cheated by the referendum result and the mind-set of their compatriots; in those parts of the country where particularly brutal massacres took place and the armed conflict had wreaked the greatest havoc, the population voted “Yes” by a large majority and was prepared for peace. Forgiveness and looking to the future were the deciding factors here. However, for many Colombians, the “justice” aspect of the agreement was neglected, so they decided against the peace propagated by Santos and wanted a better, less generous negotiating text. Currently, representatives of both camps are hoping for renegotiations.

Contrary to the fear of many Colombians, the international community responded promptly and assured them of their continued support. The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy said on 3 October 2016 that the European Union respects the decision of the Colombian people; it is now up to all those involved in Colombia to unite and find the path to peace together. The EU has supported Colombia consistently since the beginning of the negotiations and will continue to do so. Colombia is one of the Union’s strongest allies in Latin America and the EU continues to stand behind this partnership.²⁴ Even the Nobel Prize Committee in Oslo was not long in coming forward: On 7 October 2016, President Juan Manuel Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to bring peace to Colombia. The Chair of the Committee, Kaci Kullmann Five, said in her statement on the awarding of the Nobel Prize that

not only President Juan Miguel Santos will be honoured for his efforts, but also the Colombian people who have not given up the hope for peace. Despite the failed referendum, President Santos had brought the peaceful settlement of a bloody conflict much closer. The foundation for both a demonstrable disarmament of the FARC rebels and the historic process of national reconciliation was laid. The Nobel Prize Committee thus wants to influence the process by awarding the prize to avoid the stagnation of the peace process and the reignition of the conflict. The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize is intended to encourage those seeking “peace, reconciliation and justice in Colombia”.²⁵

According to experts, the country has been “on the right course so far, be it the way to OECD membership or participation in the international missions of the UN”. (...)

What has remained for the time being is frustration on all sides. Undoubtedly, the country has missed an important opportunity. The experience in the referendum has shown that two political heavyweights like Santos and Uribe are able to split the country and neither of them can command a large majority. A defeat with 49.8 % is extremely unsatisfactory and a “victory” with 50.2 % is too slim to bring peace to the country. All political camps must inevitably come together to actually lead Colombia into a peaceful future. At least legally, the peace is still successful – contrary to the protests of the opposition against the referendum. President Santos and the rebels resumed negotiations immediately after the negative outcome of the vote and adapted some passages. The new agreement has still only been submitted to

the parliament. The President rejected a new referendum, despite fierce objections from the opposition, since it would only lead to the further division of the country. There were no major changes in the new version. The passages criticised by the opposition and the opponents of the vote are still included in the text. However, according to President Santos, the ceasefire and the general security situation took precedence.²⁶ The FARC has actually been granted ten mandates in Congress by 2026 and is allowed to stand as a political party in elections. The Constitutional Court of Colombia approved this action on 13 December 2016 with an eight-to-one decision.²⁷ The so-called “fast track” gives the government and Congress special powers to enforce the agreement. The Senate and the Congress then unanimously approved the agreement.²⁸ Probably due to the negative outcome of the referendum, the result in Colombia was tacitly noted. New discussions have been avoided as far as possible, and work is now in progress to transfer the peace from paper to reality. Negotiations with the second largest guerrilla organisation, the ELN are also still open. The Santo government recently announced that the ELN talks should resume on 10 January 2017.

A speedy peace in Colombia would also be desirable from an EU perspective. Colombia is an important trade partner of the Union and the gateway to Latin America. Stability in the region would not only lead to a decrease in the number of international trouble spots, but would also provide the Union with a reliable strategic partner in South America.

- ¹ Cf. Waldmann 1999, 260 ff.
- ² Cf. Drekonja-Kornat 2003, 7.
- ³ Cf. Zelik 2001.
- ⁴ Cf. Waldmann 1999, 273 f.
- ⁵ Cf. Hörtnner 2006, 164 ff.
- ⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, 165 ff and *Constitución Política de Colombia 1991*, 7 ff.
- ⁷ Cf. Springer 2003.
- ⁸ Cf. Zelik 2001.
- ⁹ Cf. Härtl 2011, 3.
- ¹⁰ Regarding the role of the US, see for example Lessmann 2003.
- ¹¹ Cf. *Republica de Colombia, Ley 975 de 2005 por la cual se dictan disposiciones para la re-incorporación de miembros de grupos armados organizados al margen de la ley, que contribuyan de manera efectiva a la consecución de la paz nacional y se dictan otras disposiciones para acuerdos humanitarios.*
- ¹² Cf. *Libertad Digital, Denuncian que Chávez financia a terroristas de ETA, FARC, Hamas y Hezbolá*, report from 24 July 2008, online: <http://www.libertaddigital.com/mundo/denuncian-a-chavez-por-dar-financiamiento-a-terroristas-de-eta-farc-hamas-y-hezbola-1276335348/>.
- ¹³ Cf. *El Mundo, Pastrana: el ordenador de Reyes prueba "por primera vez" la relación ETA-FARC – Cree que Chávez pide el fin de las FARC porque hay información que los relaciona*, report from 11 June 2008, online: <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/06/11/espana/1213176173.html>.
- ¹⁴ *ETA – Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque for "Basque Homeland and Liberty". A Marxist-Leninist, separatist Basque-nationalist underground organisation.*
- ¹⁵ Cf. interview with Spanish prosecutor Javier Zaragoza in the Spanish daily *El Espectador*; 115 e-mails found on the confiscated computer of assassinated guerrilla leader Raúl Reyes showed visits by some ETA members to the FARC. *El Espectador, Fiscal español confirma reuniones de Eta y FARC*, report from 25 July 2008, online: <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/articulo-fiscal-espanol-confirma-reuniones-de-eta-y-farc>.
- ¹⁶ See *Página Oficial de Juan Manuel Santos. Posesión Presidente Santos*, online: <http://www.santospresidente.com/index.asp>.
- ¹⁷ Cf. *European Commission, press release, EU supports Colombia with 575 million euros*, online: https://ec.europa.eu/germany/news/eu-unterstuetzt-friedensprozess-kolumbien-mit-575-millionen-euro_de.
- ¹⁸ Cf. *European Commission Implementing Decision on the establishment of a European Union Trust Fund for Colombia, C(2016) 1653 final, EC 13*, online: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/commission-implementing-decision-2016-1653-v3-842263_en.pdf.
- ¹⁹ Cf. *European Commission, press release, EU supports Colombia with 575 million euros*, online: https://ec.europa.eu/germany/news/eu-unterstuetzt-friedensprozess-kolumbien-mit-575-millionen-euro_de.
- ²⁰ Cf. *Enviado Especial de la UE para la paz en Colombia, Eamon Gilmore, llega al país para asistir a la firma del Acuerdo de Paz en Cartagena*, online: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/colombia/press_corner/all_news/news/2016/20160924_es.htm.
- ²¹ Cf. *Official Journal of the European Union L 259 I/1, Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1710 amending Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combatting terrorism.*
- ²² Cf. *Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combatting terrorism.*
- ²³ Cf. *El País, Proceso de Paz en Colombia, Así han sido los resultados del plebiscito en Colombia*, online: http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2016/10/02/colombia/1475372741_072614.html.
- ²⁴ Cf. *Declaración de la Alta Representante de la Unión Europea y Vicepresidenta, Federica Mogherini, sobre el resultado del plebiscito por el Acuerdo de Paz en Colombia*, online: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/colombia/press_corner/all_news/news/2016/20161003_es.htm.
- ²⁵ Cf. *The Nobel Peace Prize for 2016*, online: https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2016/press.html.
- ²⁶ Cf. *Taz, Peace process in Colombia, agreement without re-vote*, online: <https://www.taz.de/Friedensprozess-in-Kolumbien/!5360180/>.
- ²⁷ *Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 13/12/2016, Comunicado No. 52*, online: <http://www.eltiempo.com/contenido/politica/justicia/ARCHIVO/ARCHIVO-16772391-0.pdf>
- ²⁸ 24/11/2016, *Final version of the peace agreement*, online: <https://www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co/sites/default/files/24-1480106030.11-1480106030.2016nuevoacuerdofinal-1480106030.pdf>.

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